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
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In our last, we endeavoured to insist upon an essential principle, that the contemplated arrangement of our affairs must be made a thorough and therefore permanent measure. It is not enough, that it infringe upon no rule of justice, nor, so far as it may go, of expediency ;—it must be a settlement of every point that can be drawn into dispute, —a settlement calculated in every respect to be final.

We proceed to allude briefly to some of the more prominent of these points. Their number does not allow of a complete examination of them all in the columns of a newspaper. We shall endeavour not to omit any of the more important.

It is necessary, as we remarked in our last, that the proposed examination should not be limited to Lower Canada. The relations of Lower Canada with the mother country, and with the sister colonies, must receive their full share of attention. The intimate natural connection of the two Canadas especially, requires that the relations which are to subsist between *them* be attentively considered. Important as the right adjustment of our own internal affairs is to us in Lower Canada, the settlement of these other questions is hardly less so. The latter is the foundation, so to speak, on which the former must rest. Considering to what extent our past difficulties have arisen from, or been aggravated by, the



deficiencies of the Act of 1791 in this respect, the necessity of avoiding all such deficiencies in the future Act of 1840, can hardly be questioned.

There is, in some quarters, an apparent disposition to regard the separation of the North American colonies from the empire, at no very distant period, as a probable and perhaps not undesirable event. Great pains have been taken to inculcate this anti-colonial doctrine in the three kingdoms as well as in the colonies; and the natural consequence is that a good many persons are more or less imbued with it. Even in the House of Commons it has been the text on which the radical minority have enlarged for years past; and of late it has been handled too gently, to say the least, by some of the public men of both the other parties. In these colonies the leaders of the late radical party were its avowed apostles. We do not go too far when we say that some of their political opponents, even, have not been as strongly opposed to it on principle as they might have been. Their number may have been far from large, and the opinions of most of them on this point far from definite; still, there are those whose opposition to the revolutionists has not arisen from any very decided attachment to the connexion with the parent state, or any very strong desire to preserve it as a *permanent* element of the constitution. The great body of the nation at home, beyond a doubt, would scout any project for a separation; the great body of their fellow-subjects in the colonies, we are proud to believe, would oppose it no less heartily.

There is much mischief done, however, by these representations of the possibility of an abandonment of any of the British colonies. They tend to unsettle every thing,—colonial policy at home, and colonial politics here. If ever they should unhappily be realized, it will be owing mainly to this cause. Great Britain has once lost colonies; but it was through her own fault, and under circumstances not likely

ever to recur. She has but to continue to avoid the faulty policy which then cost her so dear, and the lesson will never be repeated.

It is true that from the extent of territory to be occupied by some of the colonies, the time must at last arrive when the precise colonial relation now subsisting cannot possibly continue. In North America and in Australia, whenever their population shall have become dense, (and this will not be until they are also widely extended,) British colonies *will* exist, too powerful for the control of the mother country. But that period is distant. It will be very long before any colony of Great Britain will need to be abandoned for such a cause. And even then, there is no reason why a league should not take the place of the old bond of union,—and the whole British nation thus continue *ever* united, o every intent and purpose, so far as peace, mutual good understanding, commerce, and identity of foreign policy, can unite it.

It is a great mistake, though not a very uncommon one, to speak of the British Empire as unwieldy,—because its several parts are scattered over the four quarters of the earth, and its subjects are of almost every race and creed under heaven. Such an empire is different from any which has ever before existed ; but that is surely no reason why we should look forward to its decay or overthrow. Other extensive empires, *unlike* it in their construction, have fallen. British policy must adapt itself to the peculiar resources and position of the empire. The fate of the empire may be as unlike that of former states as its position is unlike theirs.

The single fact that steam is now on the point of being successfully applied to ocean navigation, is decisive (to go no farther) on this point. When Spain and Portugal held South America and the two Indies, a voyage to their nearest colonies was an affair of months, and to the most distant, an

affair of years. The wretched system of misgovernment which they established in their colonies, grew in part out of the state of the times, and in part, also, out of this very cause. The colonies were too distant not to be misgoverned. Their mismanagement proved their ruin, and that of their founders. In the present day, the case is different. Steam-communication with the East Indies, as already established by way of the Mediterranean, brings Bombay and London within 44 days of one another. Steamships are fitting out to go from London round the Cape to Calcutta, in 52 days. Steam-frigates are exterminating the native pirates in the Eastern Archipelago. A very few more years, and who will say how much nearer the several portions of the empire may thus be brought? Edinburgh was once farther from London than Montreal will be in another week or two. Take into account, besides, the principles of government adopted everywhere under the British flag, the civilization which it carries with it, and the rapid improvement in all these respects which the *colonies* we are alluding to must produce,—and who will then limit the increase or the duration of a power which is founded on such elements?

Those who affect to philosophize in favour of an early separation of colonies from the parent state, might do well not wholly to overlook these considerations. They may lead some of them, as they do us, to a directly opposite conclusion. *Misgoverned*, a colony may gain, or it may lose, by a successful assertion of its independence. Well governed, the bright prospect for a *British colony* is in the steady maintenance—as the essential object of its policy—of its connexion with the British Empire.

MONTREAL, *April* 13, 1838.

The opinion that all colonies must, sooner or later, become wholly independent of the connexion with the parent state,

has been so often confidently asserted, and so often tacitly admitted, that, at the risk of being tedious, we return to it. Its importance, bearing as it does upon every other point in our colonial politics, must be our excuse for urging one or two more reasons, in addition to those we have already stated in opposition to it. They will serve as an introduction to the remarks we propose afterwards to offer on the relations which ought to subsist between the North American colonies in general, and the two Canadas in particular.

It is surely unnecessary to dwell upon the immense advantages which must *ever* accrue to all parts of an empire like the British Empire, from the constant maintenance of the most intimate connexion between them. Every climate, trade, production and manufacture may be found, or obtained, within their limits. The commerce between them gives its possessor the almost uncontrolled command of the sea. The only nation that can at all compete with us on this element, is, in fact, the United States—a people of our own origin and language, and endowed with the same enterprising disposition which is the peculiar feature of the British race, and to which the British Empire owes all its power. So long, however, as we remain united, we possess an immense advantage over them. We have ports *of our own*, in every sea. They have ports, only along the North Eastern border of the Atlantic. Our own possessions furnish us with the *entire* material for a most extensive trade by sea; all the trade we may carry on with other countries is so much added to this; and the mere fact that we have ports everywhere, ensures a great advantage in our foreign trade over other nations whose ports are limited to one quarter of the globe. The United States have vast resources for internal commerce, and its rivers, canals and railroads enable its people to develop those resources with great rapidity; their coasting trade, too, is considerable; but their commerce over sea is entirely

foreign, and depends, therefore, not only on their own enterprise, but also on the temper of other nations, and especially on the uninterrupted maintenance of peace between them. The government and people of the United States do their best to make up for this deficiency by their commercial treaties with foreign powers. Great Britain can also make such treaties, just as well as they can; and thus preserve her present advantage over them.

Reverse this state of things. Let any colony be cut off from this connexion.—We do not say that in such a case the whole body might not suffer; but we do say that the detached colony would suffer most. For a colony, circumstanced in regard to population as Lower Canada is, to be thus detached would be its ruin. It may be said that it would be merged in the great Republic to the South, and would share in its prosperity. There may be some who would willingly submit to the accompanying infliction of democracy in such a hope. But the hope is unfounded. Here, of all places in the world, we must have, for some time to come, a restraining and reforming government, such as we surely need not gravely argue that democracy, and connexion with the United States, would never give us. To expect prosperity without such a government is a dream,—as idle as the hope of rain would be in the heart of the Sahara. Separated from England, the fate of Lower Canada may rather be read in the fate of South America.

But we put out of view these considerations, as they are only temporary. Our position is, that the union of Great Britain and her colonies ought to be perpetual; changing, it may be, in its character, as the colonies increase in strength: but still perpetual, so far as unrestricted freedom of commerce, identity of foreign policy, the use of the same flag, the admission of a common right of citizenship, and in general, the constant maintenance of the most intimate friendly relations,

can render it. It is only thus that the great advantages of our present situation can be realised. Thus realised, he must be a bold prophet who would undertake to limit them.

What are the objections to this view?—Are we told that the several British possessions are too distant? Steam and the maintenance of general peace are annihilating distance. The Saxon Kings of England had a more disjointed empire than the present Sovereign has: though in their day, Cornwall, Wales, Scotland, and often, indeed, the northern counties of England, were all foreign states, within the compass of Great Britain, and every spot of land beyond sea was also foreign. In a few more years, the projected colony in New Zealand will be accessible, at a less cost of time and money, and with infinitely less risk, than the remoter districts of Ireland and Scotland were when first the “Three Kingdoms” came under the rule of a common Sovereign. Distance, as well as nearness, has its advantages. Modern improvements are rapidly enabling us to combine them.

Are we told that the interests of different colonies, or of the parent state and the colonies generally, are hostile? The objection is a century too late. There can be no clashing interests in the case. Clashing prejudices there may be; nothing more. The prosperity of one district is no drawback on that of others, but the contrary. Even as regards independent nations, this unsocial theory is abandoned. The wealth of England is increased, not diminished, by the wealth of France, and *vice versa*. The producer sells advantageously only when the buyer has resources to purchase at a high rate. Where would English manufactures be were England the only wealthy country in the world? The interest of every country is to promote, and not to retard, the prosperity of every other community. How much more is this the case when the communities themselves are but parts of a common whole! Different portions of the same empire with con-

flicting interests! Educate the whole community. Make them understand what their interest is. We shall then soon hear the last of this absurdity.

Are we told that all this is very fine on paper but not in practice? Are we reminded of old blunders in colonial policy, and their effects? The argument does not hold. We all know there have been errors; we all know their effects have been serious. It is these very errors and their results which have made some people hastily adopt the theory we are combating. The question is whether these errors are essential,—whether there is no remedy for them but in separation? *If* so, it is still to be determined whether separation itself may not be a more serious error—a remedy worse than the disease.

But we take no such gloomy view. The mistakes of the past *can* be avoided. The evils of separation, and the advantages of a lasting union, (maintained, as it may be, without the disadvantages which *have* lessened its value,) are too great to allow of any other than this latter course being adopted. In what way these advantages can best be secured is another question. Many plans, and many reasons for and against each, have been proposed. To discuss them all is impossible. We shall endeavour to the best of our ability to suggest some of the reasons which induce us to give the preference to the measure which we are inclined to think the best.

MONTREAL, *April* 16, 1838.

Among the various plans which have been suggested to ensure that permanence to the connexion between the mother country and the colonies for which we have been contending, the one which we feel called upon to notice first is the suggestion of giving the colonies a direct representation in the Imperial Parliament. This suggestion has lately been favourably noticed in the Parliament of Upper Canada. At first

view there appears much to support it. It is encumbered, however, with serious difficulties, which are not likely to be got rid of.

The Imperial Parliament is not merely the supreme legislature of the empire, but the local legislature of the United Kingdom. Its members act in both these capacities. In the former, colonial representatives might reasonably claim a seat in the House of Commons. In the latter, it is obvious that they would be wholly out of place. What business could members from Newfoundland, Lower Canada or New South Wales, have in the local concerns or politics of England? Or how, indeed, could they be qualified to interfere in them?—And yet, how could the distinction be drawn between the two departments,—and the powers of the colonial members limited to that department with which alone they could rightly deal?

Were a complete Legislative Union of the whole Empire the measure contemplated, *this* objection would not hold. If all Legislation were conducted by one Legislature, all its members might take part in all the business that might come before it. Members from Lower Canada might fairly vote on every Irish question, were the members for Dublin and Kilkenny equally free to vote on all Canadian questions. But we presume no one ever thought of a scheme quite so preposterous as this. The House of Commons is full large enough already, with its 658 members. Add a fair proportion for the colonies, and then, what would it become? Its affairs, too, are as complex as its numbers are large. Neither admit of multiplication. Local Legislatures for the several colonies cannot possibly be dispensed with. Retaining them, and retaining also the compound authority of the Imperial Parliament, (and we do not see how it is to be done away with,) the project of colonial representation in the Imperial Parliament must be laid aside.

There are other minor difficulties, (were this main objection

obviated,) which would still be fatal to the project. Supposing the line were drawn between the local and general business of the Imperial Parliament, and the colonial members' speeches and votes restricted to the latter, it must not be forgotten that, to make the voice of the colonies heard, a pretty strong representation would be needed. What would one or two members be, added to so many as are already in the House? How could such a representation be maintained as should prove effective? Such a delegation as could be kept up would be useless; such a delegation as might be serviceable could not be obtained.

Again, in view of this last fact especially—the impossibility of securing a sufficient number of colonial members willing and competent to act—it should not be forgotten that, though a proverb says that “a half loaf is better than no bread,” there is some danger in this case in taking up with a half provision. The Imperial Parliament having the right of legislating in matters affecting the colonies, it might, at first sight, appear better for the colonies to have some vote (though ever so insufficient) in all such legislation. This is a mistake. *No vote, or a full vote.* Let the entire responsibility rest, in all cases, upon those with whom the power rests. They will exercise it all the more cautiously. Let them share this responsibility with a nominal representation from the colonies, and their interference will be all the less cautious for the division. We know that they are careful now, how they interfere in our concerns; we do not know how careless they might become, with a few members from the colonies present and voting to share the responsibility, and not the power. A small delegation, at such a distance from their constituents, and lost in the body of which they were delegated members, could not be safely trusted.

The chief, if not the sole, advantages of this plan, as it appears to us, are to be found in the opportunities it would

afford the colonies of continually making their wishes and feelings known at home, to the authorities and to Parliament,—in the opportunities it would give colonial politicians to make themselves known in England,—and in the consequent opening it would make for colonial talent, to Imperial distinction. These advantages are important, especially when considered in their bearing upon the future maintenance of the connexion between the mother country and the colonies. Nothing could more strongly bind together the several parts of the empire than this introduction of colonists into the political world of the metropolis. Without it, indeed, it is hard to see how the connexion can be made permanent. The highest colonial offices cannot always continue to be filled from home, and no office or distinction at home be attainable by a colonist. The natives of a colony are necessarily more or less jealous of the reservation of the highest offices in their native district, from their own class. As a colony increases in age and consequence, this jealousy must increase. We do not see how it is to be checked, but by opening up other avenues to distinction, which may serve to compensate for this, which the maintenance of the colonial relation seems necessarily to close.

But for this purpose it is not necessary that colonial delegates to the metropolis should be members of Parliament. We have endeavoured to show some of the difficulties in the way of this project. They are all removed the moment we take away from it this one feature. Let delegates be sent from the colonies,—but not merged and lost in the House of Commons. There would then be none of the difficulties which grow out of the necessary powers and numbers of that body. The delegates need not be more numerous than the colonies could well afford to send. Their advice would not have the less weight for their not having direct legislative power. They might constitute a board of advice, attached

to the colonial department. They might enjoy the right of addressing either House of Parliament on matters affecting their respective colonies, or colonial policy in general. Their functions thus limited, they would have no temptation to fail in their duties to their constituents. As voting members of the House of Commons, we need not say that the case would be very different.

The full statement and consideration of this project, however, demands a separate article. We defer it, therefore, to our next.

MONTREAL, *April* 18, 1838.

A great deal of complaint has been made, at one time and another, of the defective constitution of the colonial department; and it cannot be denied that there has been, and indeed still is, some ground for complaint on this score. The machinery of the department has not been perfected as the colonies have increased in number and importance. Some years ago, a secretary of state, with his complement of under-secretaries and clerks, could very well control the affairs of the then colonies of Great Britain, as they were then conducted. At the present day it is quite another business. The affairs of the several colonies are too complex, and the effects of any blunders that may be made, too serious, for any one man to preside over them *alone*, successfully. To understand the politics of any colony thoroughly, it is necessary to have spent some time in careful observation, on the spot. One who has never himself visited a country, can form no adequate idea of its wants and capacities, the state of parties, the character of individuals, the thousand details, in fact, which are essential to a right judgment in matters affecting its government. A colonial secretary cannot have this knowledge of *all* the colonies. Often, indeed, on his entry into office, he has no such knowledge of any one of them. In office, he has

no adequate means of supplying the deficiency. The current business of the department leaves him little time to look back and study the political position of the various colonies, as he best may, even from books or documents. Besides, he has other business, foreign to his own department, to look to, in order to preserve his seat as a cabinet minister. Domestic politics he understands; his office depends upon them. Colonial politics are, of necessity, too often left in the back ground. With all the talent and the best intentions in the world, it is impossible for any man so circumstanced, to avoid mistakes.

To meet this difficulty it has been suggested that a board, to consist of ex-governors, secretaries, judges, and other officers of colonies, resident colonial merchants and others who have lived in the colonies, should be created, to assist the colonial minister with their advice. This plan has its advantages,—and its disadvantages, too. It is well, as a part of the system; inadequate, if it is to be the whole. Such a board could give correct information about the past, but could not possibly be equally well acquainted with the present. In new countries, things change rapidly, and the latest information is as necessary as any other.

A representation of the colonies, such as we suggested in our last, would meet this difficulty. With a board of advice, consisting partly of the material above mentioned, and partly of delegated agents from the several colonies, the department would no longer suffer from any lack of information of any description. Such a body, it might be expected, would secure the adoption and maintenance of an enlightened and consistent policy, the effects of which on the interests of the empire could not fail in a very few years to be most striking.

In our last, we urged some of the reasons which seem to us strongly to require the adoption of the principle of direct colonial representation at the seat of the imperial govern-

ment, and also some of the reasons which as strongly indicate the impossibility, and indeed the impolicy, of giving to such representation a place in the House of Commons. We did not then urge the consideration, that such a step would require a most material innovation upon the constitution of the House as established by the Reform Bill, and indeed upon the entire fabric of the British Constitution itself. No party in England would be likely to carry, or indeed to propose, such a measure. And, supposing it carried, and every other objection removed, whether arising from the *Local* Legislative powers of the House, the number of its members, or the danger of taking up with an insufficient representation, or of trusting colonial M. P.'s so far from their constituents, — setting all these aside for the sake of argument, — it is still to be remembered, that the plan gives the colonies a voice only in one House of Parliament, leaving the other precisely where it was. On all these accounts, there can hardly be a question which of the two kinds of representation is the more desirable.

In speaking of colonial agents, or representatives, as we have done, we wish the distinction to be clearly borne in mind, between such a representation of the colonies and the late *mis*-representation system, adopted by one party in this colony. It is not to a salaried member of the Imperial Parliament, the representative of one party, that we would propose to commit this trust. The agent or agents must be delegated, in the true sense of the word ;—regularly appointed by the Legislature, (not by one branch of it,) and chosen from the colony. It would be easy so to order the mode of election as to secure a fair share in the delegation to both the contending parties in any colony.

A board of advice thus constituted, we repeat, would, in all probability, very soon effect all the required improvements in the conduct of the colonial department. The secretary would still remain, as he is now, the responsible executive

minister ; in fact, his responsibility would be as much increased as his power to discharge his duties would be, by the existence of the board. At present, he has only to make himself acceptable to Parliament ; and this is to be done by the general policy of the cabinet, rather than by his own colonial measures. He would *then* have to manage his colonial advisers also, who would look directly to the colonies and judge of him by his own doings. Their disapproval of his measures would be very apt to make Parliament look much more closely into the matter, than under the old system they have ever done. By giving the delegates a right to bring up colonial questions in Parliament, or to speak upon them when before either House, this end would be fully attained.

There are many other incidental advantages of such a system, upon which we have not space at present to enlarge. In the selection of colonial governors, it would ensure a much more careful and thorough scrutiny into their qualifications than is at present possible. In giving them their instructions, in judging of their measures and recommendations,—in every act, in short, of the department, it would be of essential service to the minister. It would keep the attention of Parliament and of the nation more steadily directed to the colonies, and would ensure us no small benefit thereby. Commercial legislation and treaties would be better looked to, in connection with our interests. The statesmen of the mother country would be made more intimately conversant with our wants ; and our own leading public men would be made better acquainted with *their* views, and would be introduced, not merely to a wider field for their own personal ambition, but to one on which they could better serve the colony of their birth or adoption, and the empire at large. The colonial policy of the empire might further be expected to become, under the influence of such a system, *progressive*, as it must, if it is to keep pace with the exigencies of the times. As the

colonies increase in power and resources, it would adapt itself to their changing relations towards the parent state ; and thus the present temporary bond of colonial inferiority and metropolitan control, would gradually convert itself into that more equal bond of union, under which alone the several portions of the British Empire can remain *permanently* united, for their common good.

MONTREAL, *May* 10, 1838.

We observe in the last number of the *Toronto British Colonist*, a very favourable notice of Mr. Robert Montgomery Martin's project for the re-organisation of the colonial office. The following able article on the subject, from a late English paper, is reprinted in that journal, and its conclusions adopted without reserve.—There is certainly much in the plan, and in the article too, that is valuable. So far as the general principle goes, we think every colonist must agree with them. On some points, however, we cannot arrive at the conclusion which their authors favour.

In giving insertion to the article in question, we may remark that there is in one or two passages, a little of that spirit of exaggeration which it is almost impossible to avoid in controversy. The *very* rapid changes in the colonial office, for instance, cited as evidence against the present system, are not the rule, but the exception. That a system is terribly defective, which *ever* admits of such frequent transition of powers so extensive, cannot, however, be doubted. Of the importance of the colonies, and the extreme difficulty of the task of superintending their administration, too much is not said, because too much can hardly be said.

“OBSERVATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITION.

“1. No uniformly wise colonial system can be acted on by reason of the constant changes of the secretary and under-secretary of state.

" Between March, 1833, and April, 1835, there were *eight* secretaries and under-secretaries of state ; and subsequently two assistant under-secretaries; thus making ten changes within about two years. (In one year, from April, 1834, to April, 1835, there were three secretaries and three under-secretaries of state.) The names will sufficiently indicate the fluctuations of counsel that must have prevailed in the colonial office during this brief period.

" Secretaries of State.—Lord Stanley, Mr. T. Spring Rice, Earl of Aberdeen, and Lord Glenelg.

" Under-Secretaries of State.—Viscount Howick, Mr. Lefevre, Mr. Gladstone and Sir George Grey.

" Assistant Under-Secretaries of State.—Mr. Hay and Mr. Stephen.

" 2. Those who have the management of the vast and complicated affairs of the colonies have no local, and probably but very slight personal, knowledge of our transmarine possessions—the heads of the office are naturally much occupied with the patronage which extends from a governorship down to a custom-house officer—the clerks, on whom the business devolves, cannot be supposed to be desirous of extra trouble—and Parliament is too busily engaged with domestic matters to pay much attention to the wants, feelings, and interests of several millions of our distant subjects.

" 3. The territories under the management, control, and protecting care and patronage of the Secretary of State, are :

" In North America.—Canada, Upper and Lower, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Cape Breton and Newfoundland ; area 435,000 square miles, or 279,400,000 acres, with a population of one million and a half of white colonists. (Independent of the foregoing, Hudson Bay Territories extend over 370,000 square miles.)

" In South America.—Demerara, Essequibo, Berbice, Honduras, and the Falkland Isles ; area 165,000 square miles—or 105,600,000 acres, with a population of 120,000.

" In the West Indies.—Jamaica, Trinidad, Tobago, Grenada, St. Vincent, Barbadoes, Saint Lucia, Dominica, Antigua, Montserrat, Nevis, St. Kitts, Anguilla, Tortolla and the Virgin Isles, New Providence and the Bahama Islands, St. George's and the Bermuda Isles ; area 13,000 square miles, or 7,720,000 acres ; population, 1,000,000.

" In Africa.—The Cape of Good Hope, Mauritius, Mahe and the Seychelle Islands, Saint Helena, Ascension, Sierra Leone, the Gambia, Accra, Cape Coast, &c. ; area 250,000 square miles, or 160,000,000 acres ; population, 350,000.

" In Australasia.—New South Wales, Van Dieman's Island, Swan River, King George's Sound, South Australia, Norfolk Island, &c. ; area 500,000 square miles, or 320,000,000 acres ; population, 120,000.

" In Asia.—Ceylon ; area 24,644 square miles, or 11,771,160 acres ; population, 1,000,000.

" In Europe.—Gibraltar, Malta, Gozo, Corfu, Cephalonia, Zante, Santa Maura, Ithaca, Paxo, Cerigo, &c., Heligoland ; area 1,500 square miles, or 1,000,000 acres ; population, 400,000.

" Total under the Colonial Secretary.—1,750,000 square miles, equal to 1,120,000,000 acres ; with a population of at least 5,000,000 of British subjects, and daily increasing.

" 4. The languages used in these different colonies embrace the English, French, Dutch, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, Greek, Maltese, Cingalese, &c.

" 5. The laws are more or less based on the customs of the different nations from whom these languages are derived, and from whom we obtained the possessions.

" 6. The religions embrace the English Episcopalians, Scotch English and Irish Presbyterians, Dutch, Lutheran, Roman Catholic, and Greek Churches, with various shades of Pagan idolatry and forms of worship.

" 7. The value of the maritime commerce of the above men-

tioned possessions is i aggregate of £35,000,000 per annum; and the value of the property, public and private, moveable and immoveable, in lands, houses, roads, forts, canals, ships, trading stock, and horses, oxen, sheep, &c., is £450,000,000! all confided to the responsibility of a single individual who has no permanency of office, and no local knowledge of the vast interests committed to his care.

" 8. Some of the colonies have an exceedingly democratic form of government, namely, a controlling Representative Assembly, with a £10 franchise constituency—others have a Legislative Council, appointed by the secretary of state, and consisting chiefly of the principal government officers, and some have no ruling authority but the fiat of the governor. Under all these different systems there is no fixed principle—internal discord and party feeling follow in the wake of the politics of the secretary of state at home, and all the evils of sectarianism (lay and clerical) are in full force, to the utter ruin of social concord, and the great detriment of the commerce, peace, and prosperity of each settlement.

" Governors and public functionaries are not chosen in reference to their personal qualifications, but chiefly with regard to their political bias, their family connections and parliamentary influence; and the unfortunate consequences of such an exercise of power are felt at the extremities, and re-act on the very heart of the empire, as exemplified at this moment in the state of Canada, and which will be the case with every other colony as soon as its inhabitants feel their strength, and become sensible of the cause of their suffering.

" As a remedy of these evils, it is suggested to form an administrative board in Downing-street for the management of colonial affairs, with a secretary of state as at present, but aided by a council of retired governors, judges, and civilians, who possess a local and general knowledge of our maritime possessions; the number of the council not to exceed

or to be less than twelve, of whom six shall change with the secretary of state (on constitutional grounds) and six shall hold office *quam diu se bene gesserint*, with two assistant permanent under-secretaries for the respective departments of the colonies in the eastern and western hemisphere. This exposition will, it is to be hoped, sufficiently explain and justify the petition to Parliament, which is totally unconnected with party or personal considerations, and seeks to aid rather than embarrass government.

"The inhabitants of the different colonies, and all who are interested in this vital subject, are requested to use every lawful effort in support of a Parliamentary enquiry, as there are great difficulties to be overcome before a just colonial government can be formed."

The question of remedy is the great question. And here the suggestions of Mr. Martin are surely insufficient. An "administrative board," such as he proposes, is, on many accounts, objectionable. The number, "twelve," is too small, if it be intended to secure to the department on all colonial questions the advice of persons practically acquainted with every colony. It would scarcely be easy to select twelve men, who could advise, from their own practical knowledge, on all occasions. Again, supposing this board an "*administrative* board," with six of its members holding office permanently, the check upon the colonial secretary would be so great as to deprive him of that power in the department, which a responsible adviser of the crown must have. How could Parliament censure a colonial minister with his hands tied by an "administrative" council, one-half of its members irremovable, and the other half removable only by his own resignation of office? The head of a department must be responsible. To be responsible, he must have power. To suppose that either a board of twelve persons, half of them holding office for life, or a colonial secretary shackled by

such a board, could be made responsible to Parliament, is to suppose an impossibility.

A still stronger objection to the plan is to be found in the proposed composition of the board. It is all one-sided. Ex-governors and other retired functionaries of colonies, and merchants and others resident for years out of the colonies, are not the men to be trusted as the sole advisers of the department. It is very well that they should advise ; but others should advise too. Men delegated directly from the colonies, practically acquainted with their respective circumstances, should be present to contribute their share of information to the department. The present wants and wishes of the colonies should be known as well as their past condition ; and the feelings of the many out of office represented, as well as those of the official few. In both these respects, the proposed composition of the board is faulty.

The more this subject is looked into, the more clearly we think it will be seen that the colonial minister ought not to be *controlled* by any " administrative " board with irremovable members—that he ought to have *advisers*, sufficiently numerous to ensure practical information from one or other of them, on every point on which he might have occasion for it—and that *among* those advisers there ought to be persons delegated from the several colonies to discharge that trust.

The importance of this subject demands for it a far larger share of attention—in the colonies especially—than it has ever yet received. Above all, it is no party subject, but one upon which all men should decide, without reference to party politics, imperial or colonial. On these two points we agree most heartily with our Toronto contemporary.